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Performance	and	Power	in	Social	Movements:	Biko’s	Role	as	a	Witness	in	the	SASO/BPC	
Trial		
Marcus	Morgan,	University	of	Bristol,	UK	 Published	in	Cultural	Sociology	
Abstract	 This	article	provides	a	case	study	of	the	relationship	between	performance	and	power	in	social	movements.	It	reveals	how	movements	are	able	to	reiterate	established	cultures	of	resistance	across	time	and	space	through	performative	means.	It	also	shows	how	–	given	requisite	stage	settings	and	skilful	actors	–	methods	of	performance	allow	movements	to	subvert	established	structures	of	domination	to	their	political	advantage.	It	does	this	through	focussing	on	Steve	Biko’s	role	as	a	defence	witness	in	an	apartheid-era	political	trial	of	leaders	of	the	Black	Consciousness	Movement	(BCM).	It	demonstrates	how,	within	the	courtroom	setting,	Biko	and	the	defendants	improvised	upon	various	pre-established	codes,	scripts,	and	dramatic	techniques,	augmenting	the	likelihood	that	their	performances	would	resonate	successfully	with	their	audiences.	In	addition,	it	shows	how	Biko	and	the	defendants	used	social	performance	to	subvert	many	of	apartheid’s	established	culture	structures,	enabling	them	not	only	to	explicitly	articulate	the	principles	of	BC	philosophy,	but	also	to	implicitly	embody	and	act	them	out.	 
Keywords:	apartheid,	Black	Consciousness	Movement,	Steve	Biko,	cultural	inversion,	cultural	reiteration,	performativity,	social	movements	 
 
Courtrooms are often the place of high drama, intrigue and subtle legal manoeuvrings. The trial of 
Sathasivan Cooper and Eight Others was no exception. (Millard Arnold, 1979: xxvi)  
Even in societies where opposition to government policy is routinely suppressed, courtrooms 
sometimes become spaces in which cracks of indeterminacy, challenge, and performative subversion 
appear. If a concern remains with operating on the basis of due legal process (however unjust the laws 
of the land may themselves be), such cracks can occasionally find themselves prised open by skilful 
political maneuverers.  
Leaving aside the more general performative means through which members of the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM) enacted forms of citizenship formally denied them under apartheid 
(Morgan and Baert, 2017), this article focuses on a particular dramatic scene in the biography of the 
BCM’s most celebrated charismatic leader, and one of its eventual martyrs, Steve Biko. The scene is 
Biko’s appearance in court in May 1976 as a witness in the case of ‘The State vs. Saths Cooper and 8 
Others.’1 Through this case study, the article demonstrates the importance of pre-established cultural 
formations in both enabling and limiting effective political performance. It does this by showing both 
how established repertoires of resistance can be innovatively reiterated across settings, and how 
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established codes of domination can be subverted to a movement’s political advantage by dexterous 
actors working within particular stage settings.  
The importance of such stage settings is paramount. Courtrooms are conventionally 
understood as venues in which individualised narratives of guilt and innocence are publically enacted, 
and their truth or falsity determined. Debates within legal scholarship have improved upon this 
understanding by focusing on the role played by landmark court decisions in enacting widespread 
social change (e.g. Dahl, 1957; Rosenberg, 1991). This case, however, shows how the formal and 
informal rules of a courtroom venue can be drawn upon not merely to demonstrate the innocence of 
the accused or act against established powers via formal rulings, but instead to establish the 
culpability of the system that brought charges against them via a series of dramatic manoeuvres. To 
show how such subversive manoeuvres were enacted, the article focusses upon the performative 
subtext of the courtroom proceedings, rather than its explicit legal content (IUEF, 1977; Lobban, 
1996). In other words, it examines how the defence, and Biko’s testimony, manifested and actualised 
the BCM philosophy through a variety of dramatic techniques.2 Since such actualisations did things, 
rather than simply represented things, the article proposes that they ought to be analysed as 
‘performative’ acts. This analysis develops Austin’s well-known distinction between ‘constative’ 
utterances, which simply describe the world in either a true or false way, and ‘performative’ speech-
acts (e.g. ‘I promise’) that aim to affect that world in either a ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’ manner 
(Austin, 1962: 1–25). One of the crucial points Austin makes is that performatives frequently 
masquerade as constatives, therefore requiring analysis to identify their actual nature. Whilst Austin’s 
concern was with performatives in language, this article identifies comparable processes occurring in 
a far broader conception of social performance that has developed out of sociological studies of face-
to-face interaction (e.g. Goffman, 1990 [1959]).  
As well as building upon philosophical work on ‘performativity’, the article also contributes 
to a diverse body of literature critical of the deficit of cultural analysis in mainstream social 
movement studies (e.g. Alexander, 1996; Jasper, 1997; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Polletta, 
2006; Snow et al., 1986; Swidler, 2001; Touraine, 1981; Williams, 1995). Whilst this literature has 
criticised the lack of attention paid to such things as values, collective identities, narrativisation, 
framing, and emotions (all of which were important aspects of the BCM not addressed in great detail 
here), with certain notable exceptions (e.g. Alexander, 2011), less attention has been paid to the role 
of social movement performance in manipulating extant cultural codes to bring about movement 
objectives. Whilst ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) have long been recognised in movement 
studies, the focus has typically been on tactical diffusion and ‘spill-over’ between movements (Meyer 
and Whitter, 1994; Soule, 1997). Direct emphasis on the creative reworking of the codes that structure 
public meaning-making, alongside ‘thickly descriptive’ accounts of how these processes take place, 
has been dealt with more thoroughly in empirical studies of the performance of dominant power (e.g. 
Geertz, 1980), often embodied in the form of iconic political leaders (e.g. Alexander and Jaworsky, 
2014; Mast, 2012). This article therefore also contributes to this latter literature, both by showing how 
the BCM – and Biko in particular – effectively improvised upon pre-existent culture structures 
embedded within South Africa’s resistance movements, and also how they deliberately inverted and 
transgressed dominant culture structures, themselves invested in maintaining apartheid’s cultural 
Page 3 of 23 
legitimacy. The argument therefore illustrates Raymond Williams’s contention that culture ‘is always 
both traditional and creative’ (1989: 4), always torn between conservation and innovation.  
After providing some contextual scene-setting and elaborating on the methods used, I 
introduce the cast in the courtroom scene over the days in which Biko’s witness testimony was heard. 
I then describe elements of the backstage preparation for the case before turning to the main concern: 
a direct analysis of the actors’ onstage performances. I conclude by drawing out the importance of 
pre-established cultural formations in both enabling and limiting effective political performance, 
noting that the cultural reiteration and subversion practices identified here are ongoing processes.  
Setting	the	Scene	 
Part of the lesson learnt from the post-Sharpeville crackdown on apartheid opposition was 
that incriminating political writings invited government reprisal. Also, although African illiteracy and 
semi-literacy rates had improved during the preceding decade (Charney, 1993), they were still 
relatively high during the 1970s (Fuller et al., 1996), and in this context, other modes of 
communicating ideas beyond the written word acquired greater importance. Gerhart discusses how 
the adoption of Black Power symbolism, for instance, conveyed messages ‘in a nonverbal language 
that even the most politically uneducated or illiterate person could understand’ (1978: 295; see also 
Hill, 2015). The Black Power salute in particular functioned as a totemic signal through which 
individual Blacks identified a sense of communion with Blacks as a group, and Blackness as an ideal. 
The growing of ‘afro’ hairstyles, the adoption of Africanist iconography, and the shunning of skin 
lightening creams helped perform similar functions. Public speaking was also important, for, as Biko 
noted: ‘People can hear—they may not be able to read and write—but they can hear and they can 
understand the issues when they are put to them’ (1979: 57). As is common in social movements (e.g. 
Eyerman and Jamison, 1998; Rosenthal and Flacks, 2011), and especially so in South Africa (e.g. 
Ansell, 2004; Brown, 1997; Coplan, 2008), the BCM had also been using artistic performance to 
spread their ideas through groups such as the Theatre Council of Natal, the People’s Experimental 
Theatre, the Black Art Studio, and the Music, Drama, Arts, and Literature Institute. Indeed, as Walshe 
points out, ‘five of the thirteen brought to trial were from this world of black theatre’ (1983: 150; see 
also Cooper, 2016; Gerhart, 1978: 298; Moodley L, 2017; Variava, 2017). Poetry, plays, and a 
satirical song were included in the prosecution’s evidence during the case (AD1719) meaning that 
performance was not only a medium of resistance within the courtroom, but also a matter over which 
they were bring tried.  
Even though no act of terror had taken place, or been planned, the defendants in this case 
were nevertheless accused of ‘participation in terroristic activities’ and ‘promoting racial hostility’ 
(AD1719, D) under Section 2 of the country’s notorious 1967 Terrorism Act. This charge carried a 
minimum sentence of five years imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of death by hanging.3 Under 
this Act, ‘terrorism’ was defined in astonishingly malleable terms (Dugard, 1978), including, for 
instance, any act with ‘intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic’ or ‘cause, 
encourage or further feelings of hostility between white and other inhabitants of the Republic’ or, 
without irony, simply any act that ‘embarrasses the administration of the affairs of the state’. A 
terrorist ‘act’ itself could literally be anything, and once accused – in contravention of the typical 
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presumption of innocence – the onus was on the defendant to prove that their intention was not to 
commit terrorism.4 The legislation had been introduced in 1967 to crack down on SWAPO (South 
West African People’s Organisation) milita, and also functioned retroactively for five years, which 
meant that those convicted could be executed for acts that were not in fact crimes when they were 
committed (Lobban, 1996: 48f2). The Act itself was draconian in the vagueness of its formulation, but 
the terms of the specific indictment were likewise broad and ill-defined, so broad in fact that the court 
ordered the state to supply further particulars since the ambiguity of the initial charges made it 
impossible to prepare an adequate defence (Wikileaks, 1975b). All this ambiguity allowed on the one 
hand, for an alleged conspiracy to be fabricated out of very flimsy evidence, and political and racist 
bias to fill the gaps that a lack of legislative clarity left open. On the other hand, however, it opened 
up an indeterminacy to the proceedings that the defence and their witnesses could use to their 
advantage.  
The trial dragged on for over 17 months, constituting the longest Terrorism Act trial to date, 
and the accused had already been detained, incommunicado, for almost seven months prior. Over 
8000 pages of evidence were collected and the estimated cost for both prosecution and defence 
exceeded R120,000 (CISA, 1976: 15). Biko’s appearance as a defence witness – one of 61 witnesses 
who would ultimately be called – lasted for five days. Biko had founded and acted as the first 
president of the primary organ of the BCM, the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), and at 
the time of the trial he was honorary president of the political wing of the movement, the Black 
Peoples’ Convention (BPC). He had been under a banning order since 1973, which, amongst a raft of 
other prohibitions on his freedom, restricted him to his hometown of King William’s Town in the 
Eastern Cape. His banning order also forbade him from speaking in public, so this event, like all the 
best performances, was preceded by an apparent hush (apparent, because in actual fact he had 
continued writing pseudonymously).5 Most importantly, it presented a rare opportunity for Biko to 
voice his ideas, not only in front of the immediate captive audience in the courtroom, but also, and 
perhaps more significantly, to the wider public, both nationally and internationally, via the bridge 
provided by the journalists reporting on the case, in spite of official censorship.6 Inadvertently or not, 
the courtroom stage provided Biko, via the gathered journalists, with a powerful ‘means of symbolic 
production’ (Alexander, 2004) when he was officially prohibited from engaging in public 
communication.  
Such a dramatic pause had also preceded the emergence of the BCM itself in the late 1960s, 
thanks to the National Party’s ruthless suppression of the two main opposition movements, the ANC 
and the PAC, following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre. As Gerhardt writes, ‘silence pervaded African 
political life in the 1960s’ to the point that ‘Blacks who spoke out invited martyrdom’ (1978: 257). 
Zithulele Cindi recalls that ‘after Mandela and everyone had been arrested, the older generation were 
cowed down – the intimidation had really got hold of them’ (Cindi, 2015). A primary goal of the 
BCM was to challenge this pervasive fear and timidity directly (e.g. Biko, 1978), and the movement 
quickly and energetically went about filling the quiet.  
Methods	 
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The argument presented here draws predominantly from two data sources: one is based upon 
retrospective recollection, the other was recorded at the time of the events. The retrospective data 
were gathered through in-depth narrative interviews conducted with activists from the trial and their 
associates, including seven of the 13 initially charged, and five of the eventual nine who were 
recharged and ultimately sentenced. The majority of these interviews were conducted and recorded by 
the author, and ranged in length from two to seven hours, with some interviews taking place over 
several days. Participants were selected on the basis of their proximity to the court proceedings and 
their availability to be interviewed. In addition, further contextual data were drawn from interviews 
conducted as part of a broader project into the BCM also conducted by the author. The data recorded 
at the time of the events were primarily in the form of court transcripts archived in the Historical 
Papers Collection of the William Cullen Memorial Library at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
The transcript of Biko’s specific contribution to this trial – which turned out to be his last public 
appearance before his death – also appeared outside South Africa in a book edited by Millard Arnold 
(Biko, 1979). Section 11(g) of the Internal Security Act forbade publication of Biko’s evidence within 
the country, and newspapers had to be granted a special exemption from this rule by the Minister of 
Justice. Additional data from the time of the events come from documents published by the BCM and 
allied organisations, media articles on the movement, and some leaked contemporaneous US 
diplomatic cables which – written with different interests in mind – provide an alternative angle on 
the events occurring within South Africa at the time. Whilst the epistemological position adopted in 
this article rejects the notion that such data triangulation is able to provide any ultimate test of the 
validity of one’s findings, it does defend the notion that interpretive nuance is established through 
adding additional coordinates to one’s hermeneutic circle.  
The data sources selected are not without shortcomings. Unlike other open-ended question–
answer format interviews, narrative interviewing aims to avoid imposing the researcher’s own 
conceptual schema on the interview, aspiring instead to reconstruct an account of an event from an 
informant’s own perspective, storyline, and terminology (Bauer, 1996: 7). This helps draw out 
Verstehen, which can be particularly useful when exploring the subjective meanings of particular 
events held by participants or onlookers. This strength is also a weakness if the aspiration is to 
determine a less subjective standpoint, since subjective experience is, by definition, differential 
experience. Once this experience is further mediated, first through subjective memory (in this case of 
an event that occurred some 40 years earlier), and second through conscious or unconscious 
subjective positioning of self and others (a particularly salient matter in politically-charged or 
adversarial contexts such as this court case) narrative accounts can appear to drift even further away 
from the terra firma of objective empiricism.  
Although the gleaning of subjective narrative is my primary concern, the use of the court 
transcripts – themselves mediated, though to a lesser extent, through their transcription – helps 
balance out the potential subjectivist shortcomings of the narrative interviews. First, the fact that they 
were recorded at the time helps overcome the memory mediation issue. Second, the fact that they 
were produced for legal documentation purposes reduces the influence of bias arising from political 
positioning. Although it would be naïve to believe in a functioning democratic ‘separation of powers’ 
under apartheid, a curious element of apartheid courts was their performance of due process, even 
whilst the laws they enacted were themselves morally corrupt. This concern with appearances meant 
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that even though courts served as tools for enforcing some of the most iniquitous injustices of 
apartheid, they could also serve as arenas for resistance.7  
Dramatis	Personae	 
The law is theatre. (Sartre, 1976: 126)  
Whilst a host of secondary actors operated in the background of the main stage, the principal 
cast in the courtroom on the days that concern us were as follows. Firstly, the lawyers: the senior 
prosecution lawyer for the state, Kevin Attwell, was on the plaintiff’s table, and the senior defence 
lawyer, David Soggot, was on the defence table. An American diplomatic cable noted how the 
‘defence approached some fity [sic] senior advocates to undertake trial before success’ since ‘many 
senior advocates [were] hoping someday to receive judgeship and therefore hesitant about getting 
involved in a political trial of this nature’ (Wikileaks, 1975a). Schechner discusses how the role of the 
barrister grew out of the medieval practice of settling disputes by proxy; where the nobility would 
employ a ‘champion’ to defend their interests through combat (1988: 238). However, during the days 
that are of interest to us here, it was Biko – rather than the defence lawyers – who adopted the 
principle ‘champion’ role, performing his act on the witness stand in direct representation of the 
defendants.  
Presiding over the scene, and punctuating the lawyers’ cross-examination and Biko’s 
testimony with occasional interjections from the bench, was Judge Boshoff. George Bizos describes 
how ‘in Biko’s time there was not a single black judge ... in South Africa’ (1998: 87) and Karis and 
Gerhart note that during this period ‘virtually all judges had a predisposition to favour the state in 
security cases’ (1997: 143). The judge’s role was particularly powerful since jury trials had been 
abolished in 1969, and he was therefore entirely responsible for rendering the ultimate verdict. 
Consequently, his role as an audience to be persuaded was critical. Biko’s testimony was under oath, 
and throughout the trial the participants were expected to address their contributions directly to the 
judge in the formal manner of ‘my Lord’. This, combined with the architecture of the room and the 
costumes of court attire – robes, wigs, neck bands, etc. – helped reinforce the established hierarchy of 
the various actors, illustrating Geertz’s (1980, 1983) insight into how power is routinely dramatised to 
those over whom it is exercised. As we shall see, Biko and the defendants would later disrupt this 
spectacle of hierarchy and rank through similar means of dress and address.  
Finally, it is worth noting the role played by the audience in co-producing the scene. Whilst the 
audience were engaged in decoding the various actors’ encodings (Hall, 1973) they also participated 
in performance themselves. Despite police intimidation (Magaziner, 2010: 153) supporters crowded 
the courtroom gallery and the steps leading up to the building on a daily basis to chant, sing, in 
demonstrate their solidarity with the accused (Manchester Guardian, 1976).  
Backstage	 
Social performance usually begins long before actors arrive on the primary stage, and can 
continue long after they have left it (Goffman, 1990 [1959]: 114–40). In this particular drama, much 
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backstage activity had occurred in the meetings with the legal teams in preparation for the case, as 
well as during the informal encounters amongst the accused in the various holding locations prior to 
the trial commencing (Cooper, 2016; Moodley S, 2002). These included the Fisher Street Special 
Branch Office in Durban, Pretoria’s notorious Compol Building, where the defendants had been 
interrogated and from which reports of torture were commonplace, and eventually the Pretoria Central 
‘New Lock’ Prison in Potgieter Street (Cooper, 2016).8  
Backstage performance typically includes preparation and rehearsal for the main event, and 
both formal and informal groundwork helped ready the accused for the courtroom scene. Informally, 
Zithulele Cindi recalls how during this period,  
trials tended to be sombre, apologetic affairs, but our trial was not like this. Immediately after 
we left prison and were put into the police vans ... usually what you have is a police convoy 
with sirens wailing. Not here. We were the sirens in this case! We’d be singing revolutionary 
songs, fists out, ‘Amandla!’ [power] ‘Ngawethu!’ [is ours] – it was like this for two years in 
Pretoria. Then when we got there, the trial was supposed to start, we began our singing again 
in the courtroom every day – the [banned] national anthem [Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika] and other 
struggle songs – and people in the gallery would join in with us ... the judge would have to 
wait for us to finish, then he’d enter the court ... that was the spirit ... a lot of people were very 
politicised by the trial. (Cindi, 2015)  
Such dramatic ritual activity can jolt participants into states of ‘collective effervescence’ 
(Durkheim, 2001 [1912]), helping cement and reaffirm symbolic boundaries of group membership 
(Ramphele, 1995: 106). It can also generate and spread affect, as Asha Moodley, wife of accused no. 
9, described when first encountering the defendants after their arrest, having been denied contact 
during their detention. She remembers that although they looked ‘quite skinny and lean ... they were, 
shockingly, in the most amazingly high spirits, and I think this boosted our morale too, because I 
think prior to that [our mood] had been one of great anxiety and stress’ (Moodley A, 2002). Likewise, 
Wilson notes how Biko’s performance inside the courtroom ‘revitalised the fearful, restored 
solidarity, and assured them that they were amongst those pushing forward the struggle’ (2011: 109). 
In this spreading of affect, performances can implicitly extend invitations to group membership, as 
Cindi captures in his comment that ‘a lot of people were politicised by the trial’. Cooper (2016) 
provides further confirmation of this recruitment mechanism through his later encounters with 
converts on Robben Island.  
Backstage preparation also took more substantive and conventional forms, such as studying 
speeches delivered in previous political trials (Nefolovhodwe, 2017). Some of the accused, for 
instance, studied Andimba Toivo ya Toivo’s statement from the dock in preparation for their own 
defence (Lekota, 2016). This Namibian anti-apartheid leader’s speech had also been delivered in 
Pretoria, was also a response to a terrorism charge, and also came in advance of ya Toivo being 
ferried off to serve a term on Robben Island. As we shall see, this was but one of the preceding 
cultural models that influenced the activists’ own courtroom performances.  
On	Stage	 
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The stage upon which a performance takes place not only provides a focussed setting for a 
scene; it also suggests certain dominant readings that tacitly structure audience experience and 
expectation. The stage on which this trial unfolded was a courtroom in the Palace of Justice in 
Pretoria, a grand and imposing 19th-century Renaissance-style building that was erected on a plot of 
land where the first president of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, General M. W. Pretorius, once 
lived.  
Stages disable certain activities and the communication of certain meanings, whilst 
simultaneously enabling others. For instance, the defendants on this particular stage were not at 
liberty to exit the stage, and Biko was subpoenaed to appear as a witness, yet the courtroom also 
provided a rare public platform for speaking about political matters, something that Biko had been 
banned from doing since February 1973.  
Historical events had imbued the courtroom ‘space’ with a powerful sense of ‘place’ (Massey, 
2005) and consequently the building itself became an effectual actor in the proceedings, exerting 
‘particular narrative effects’ (Smith and Howe, 2015: 8). The Palace of Justice was well known in the 
history of the South African freedom struggle as the setting of many of its most critical legal battles. 
Even as the SASO/BPC trial was taking place, the famous anti-apartheid writer Breyten Breytenbach 
was defending himself against a treason charge in the adjacent courtroom (Cooper, 2016).  
The most important political trial to have taken place in the building, however, was the 
Rivonia Trial of 1963–1964. Symbolic parallels with this earlier event have been noted ‘both in terms 
of the fearlessness of the leadership and the content of the message that both trials sent out to the 
black community and the world at large’ (Mangcu, 2014: 194). The Rivonia Trial solidified certain 
resistance motifs in the collective cultural reservoir that could be elaborated and improvised upon by 
Biko and the accused (Lekota, 2016). It is important to note, however, that Mandela’s extraordinary 
three-hour speech at that trial had not been composed in a cultural vacuum, but was itself inspired by 
Fidel Castro’s even longer defence speech at his Santiago Trial. This is not to deny the originality of 
these speeches, but to stress that no cultural or political product is forged ex nihilo, and that all such 
products rely for both comprehension and resonance upon the reiteration and innovation of pre-
existent cultural forms. In addition, although Biko did not live to finish his law degree, he had also, 
like Castro and Mandela, been studying the profession, and this training in the art of juridical 
manoeuvre no doubt demystified legal process and reduced the intimidation that a court appearance 
might typically generate.9  
The aesthetics of the drama also reflected previous events. The defendants’ decision to 
substitute suits for black skull-caps and black t-shirts stencilled with ‘BPC’ echoed Mandela’s famous 
decision to don traditional Xhosa dress during his earlier 1962 trial. This nonverbal performance not 
only challenged expectations, but also signalled disdain for the authority indicated by the legal 
officials’ costumes thereby implying a certain contempt for the law and those who enacted it under 
apartheid. The singing of freedom songs both within and surrounding the courthouse (Cindi, 2015; 
Study Commission on US Policy Towards South Africa, 1981: 180) also ritually repeated 
performances of solidarity and defiance that had by then established themselves in South African 
legal dramas. Black Review reported how ‘the accused started singing from the cells below the court-
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room, up the stairs until they got into the court-room. At the end of the song they bellowed “POWER 
AMANDLA”’, typically ending their show ‘with the clenched fist Black Solidarity salute’ to which 
‘Black spectators from the public gallery responded’ (BCP, 1975: 85–87; Moodley L, 2017). 
Tragically, such performances – singing, saluting, Toyi-Toyi-ing,10 and slogan-shouting – which had 
been widely acted out during the solidarity rally that led to the court case, were to be repeated in 
Pretoria the following year. That time in the Old Synagogue at the event of the inquest into Biko’s 
death (Bizos, 1999: 54).  
Cultural reiteration did not stop there. Mandela’s performance at the Rivonia Trial and Biko’s 
at the SASO/BPC trial also shared a defence strategy. The prosecution made clear that the focus of the 
SASO/BPC trial would be on an idea – Black Consciousness – much more than it would be on 
particular individuals or their actions (e.g. Biko, 1978: 109; Christenson, 1991: 85; Kane-Berman, 
1978: 107; Lobban, 1996: 47; Magaziner, 2010: 153; The Star, 24 July 1976). Therefore, just as 
Mandela made the earlier decision not to ‘defend ourselves in a legal sense so much as in a moral 
sense’ (1994: 429), Biko likewise elaborated the predicament of Blacks in South Africa at the time 
and the moral necessity of BC in confronting that situation. An earlier lawyer who had proposed a 
defence strategy of contrition had been dismissed by the defendents (Nefolovhodwe, 2017). The 
strategy they instead chose to adopt involved a genuine effort to convince the audience of the 
rectitude of BC philosophy. Crucially, this audience included an openly racist white judge who 
publicly voiced his doubt that Africans were capable of democratic political organisation (Biko, 1979: 
51–60). Biko’s friend and posthumous editor, the Anglican priest Aelred Stubbs, described Biko’s 
contribution to this strategy as springing from his ‘unquenchable optimism in the power of persuasion 
if your cause was just’ (in Biko, 1978: 120), again reiterating the ‘ANC policy to try to educate all 
people, even our enemies’ (Mandela, 1994: 497). Communicating BC philosophy in an effort to 
change hearts and minds was far more important than tactical manoeuvring to ensure the acquittal of 
the accused. As Biko expressed it in court, ‘ordinarily people who get exposed to Black thinking 
begin to be aware of the need for change’ (1979: 210, see also 223 and 70). Indeed, Biko provided 
such a thorough exposition of BC thinking in the courtroom that the book containing the first 
publication of his witness testimony could quite appropriately take the simple title Black 
Consciousness in South Africa (Biko, 1979).11  
Rhetoric was one technique through which Biko sought to fulfil this strategy of persuasion, 
and since its inception, courtrooms have, alongside public assemblies, served as rhetoric’s model 
setting. Since rhetoric is persuasive rather than simply demonstrative – providing arguments rather 
than proofs – it therefore affects an audience on an emotional as well as a cognitive level. Aristotle 
refused to subordinate and oppose rhetoric to philosophical exposition as his teacher Plato had done, 
and instead folded enthymemes (rhetorical arguments) into syllogisms (logical arguments), stating 
that ‘Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic’ (Aristotle, 1991: 1354a). Rhetoric, Aristotle claimed, 
was intrinsic to good argumentation, and successful rhetoricians needed to be considered trustworthy, 
capable of affecting the emotions of their audience, and able to demonstrate their case by means of 
logical argumentation (1356a). Biko excelled at all three, but it was perhaps the second – the capacity 
to appeal to the emotions of the audience – that most defined his testimony.  
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Sydney Kentridge, for instance, remembers hearing through legal circles the ‘strong impression’ Biko 
had made ‘on an initially unsympathetic judge’ (Kentridge, 2012: 159; IUEF, 1977: 14), and in doing 
so, his rhetoric extended the performative mode into what Stanley Cavell (2005) has described as the 
‘passionate’ mode: speech-acts aimed at making moral claims on their audience. Saths Cooper (2016) 
recalls how until Soweto exploded on 16 June, the judge appeared ready to dismiss the charges 
altogether, but his mood quickly changed once the uprising began: ‘[he] began to realise that the 
result of our conscientisation would be events like June 16th – this was where our activities could 
lead’.12  
At one point, the judge unexpectedly stepped in to offer a seemingly empathetic defence 
against Attwell’s repetitive questioning of Biko on SASO’s envisioned future society:  
[Judge]: Are we getting anywhere, Mr. Attwell? ... What would you have done if you were in 
their position? What would you have done? (Biko, 1979: 304–306)  
In spite of the rewards gained through this persuasive approach, it remained necessary to 
balance the strategic goal of conveying the rectitude of BC philosophy with the immediate imperative 
of challenging the accused’s convictions, because the stakes in the latter were so high and the spectre 
of capital punishment loomed over the proceedings. The stakes were not only high for the defendants, 
but also for the witnesses since assassination was by this point an established tactic of the security 
police. Indeed, both Biko and an earlier defence witness (the philosopher, Rick Turner) were dead at 
the hands of the security police within two years of the conclusion of the trial. All this added to the 
momentousness of Biko’s testimony, and due to the terms under which the indictments were brought, 
the playing field was far from level.  
Strategically, Biko gave voice to the tenets of BC in part through performatively displaying 
the dignified self-confidence that the philosophy itself espoused. He had previously argued that fear 
was a central determinant in South African politics (1978: 73–81), and his self-assured performance 
implicitly communicated the need to confront such fear head on, both within and beyond the 
courtroom. More immediately, however, he also had to downplay the revolutionary ambitions of the 
movement (Christenson, 1991; Mangcu, 2014: 195), deny any connection to illegal organisations such 
as the banned PAC and the ANC when they were in fact secretly negotiating a united front (Mangcu, 
2014: 245–247; Wilson, 2011: 101–104), and characterise BC as unequivocally opposed to violence 
when its actual position was far more ambivalent (Mokoape, 2017; Nolutshungu, 1982: 178–185).13 
At the most basic level he had to convince the judge that the BCM’s activities were all conducted 
within the confines of the law (Pityana, 1991) whilst simultaneously dodging Attwell’s barrage of 
leading questions and avoiding all the hazardous paths down which he attempted to lead him. 
Attwell’s manner of questioning, appeared designed to give the impression that Biko himself was on 
trial. In short, the defence had a Sisyphean task in comparison to the prosecution, who were 
themselves shooting at a target vastly enlarged by the extraordinarily broad remit of the Terrorism 
Act.  
Biko nevertheless refused to play the apologetic role of what BC pejoratively called the ‘non-
white’ – a similar figure to the ‘Uncle Tom’ epithet in North America. Reading the transcript of his 
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testimony one is struck by the boldness of his performance, a boldness that only becomes meaningful 
with knowledge of the high-risk stage on which it was enacted. According to BC, acting self-
confidently helped free oneself from the damaging inferiority complexes that apartheid had instilled 
in the minds of Blacks, in the process stripping racial hierarchy of its doxic aura. Emulating another 
group understood to be essentially superior was identified as psychologically damaging and self-
alienating. Biko explained that it condemned the self to eternally imitative performances, which 
would by definition remain inferior since only members of that elevated group ‘can tell us how good 
our performance is’ (Biko, 1978: 95). Even one of the BCM’s most dismissive Marxist critics 
described the trial as their most ‘courageous showing’, acknowledging that neither ‘the accused, nor 
those called as witnesses for the defence, made any concessions on principled political issues’ 
(Hirson, 1979: 293; 162). However, if self-confidence is to be accepted by an audience, it needs to be 
convincingly demonstrated rather than simply asserted, and Biko did so in a variety of ways.  
One example is his transgression of a racialised taboo enshrined in the laws of ‘petty 
apartheid’ when he announced to the court that he had recently used a ‘White’ toilet within the 
courthouse (Biko, 1979: 142–143). This announcement conveyed his willingness to contravene 
demeaning racist laws within one of the institutions designed to uphold them. Another instance is 
identified by Aelred Stubbs who, in introducing a printed extract from his testimony, writes that,  
In answer to a question from Counsel for the Prosecution, ‘What do you think of Africans 
who work for the Security Police?’ came straight and clear, ‘They are traitors’, and this in a 
courtroom ringed by armed Security Police, black and white! (1978: 121)  
Again, such acts reiterated cultural scripts established in forerunning political trials. 
Mandela’s reflections on the Treason Trial, for instance, are equally applicable to the SASO/BPC 9 
trial:  
Here, probably for the first time in their lives, the judges were listening not to their domestic 
servant who said only what they knew their masters would like to hear, but to independent 
and articulate Africans spelling out their political beliefs and how they hoped to realise them. 
(Mandela, 1994: 277)  
Humour, and the willingness to use it in such a grave situation, was another way that defiant 
self-confidence was performatively communicated. To the amusement of the court, accused no. 9, 
Strini Moodley, offered an ‘anniversary cake’ with a single candle to the prosecuting lawyer, Cecil 
Rees, to mark a year since the rallies had taken place (IUEF, 1977: 10; Magaziner, 2010: 154). During 
Biko’s evidence, this humour often took the form of bathos: the sudden lightening of mood to evoke 
an anti-climax and relax a tense atmosphere. At one point the judge asked Biko ‘But now you refer to 
you people as Blacks? Why not brown people? I mean, you people are more brown than black’ (1979: 
26). Ignoring the implicit insult, Biko responded: ‘In the same way as I think White people are more 
pink and yellow and pale than White’, to which the judge simply responds ‘Quite’. ‘Laughter’ is 
recorded in the transcript. Biko then elaborated the serious point that ‘historically we have been 
defined as Black’ (1979: 26), and that acknowledging this allowed BC to reclaim ‘Blackness’ and 
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expand it to include all those racially oppressed in South Africa, including so-called ‘Coloureds’ and 
‘Indians’.  
Another moment of taboo-breaking humour was secured at the expense of the prosecuting 
lawyer, Attwell, who according to Cindi (2015) had ‘short, dark, curly hair’. Biko, searching for an 
illustration of a broader point, turned to Attwell and declared, ‘for instance, I could look at you and 
because of your short hair think that you are a Coloured and therefore call you Black’ (Biko, 1979: 
145). Again, ‘laughter’ was recorded in the transcript, and again, the humour came from the 
unexpected and risky symbolic transgression.  
Cindi (2015) stresses that these moments of laughter evoked by Biko were not confined to the 
accused and their supporters, revealing an important sociological role played by humour in such 
circumstances. Whether it results from a social pressure to appear ‘in on a joke’, or an uncontrollable 
paroxysm in response to an amusing comment, laughter’s tendency towards contagion renders it a 
powerful performative way of expanding the size of one’s sympathetic audience. At the very least, 
successfully evoking laughter can accomplish the appearance of expanding the sympathetic audience, 
and appearance is what matters in performance.  
During a debate on the viability of ‘one-man one-vote’ democracy in Africa, Biko revealed 
the judge’s own apparent ignorance, extending his performative self-confidence to the limits of what 
may have been strategically productive. First, Biko corrected the judge’s claim that the Kenyan 
independence leader Oginga Odinga had been assassinated,14 adding that he had also confused two 
other Kenyan political figures (1979: 53–4). Later in the same discussion, after appearing to suggest 
that Black South Africans were too ill-informed to build a workable democracy, the judge was forced 
to acknowledge Biko’s own intelligence and in so doing implicitly conceded apartheid’s irrationality 
in its denial of the universal franchise.  
Judge: If we have to debate whether this government should go on the gold standard or go off 
the gold standard, will you feel that you know enough about it to be able to cast an intelligent 
vote about that?  
Biko: Myself? 
Judge: Yes. 
Biko: I think probably much better than the average Afrikaner in the street, my Lord. Judge: 
Yes, well, that may be so. (Biko, 1979: 57)  
Biko was playing a dangerous game, and another witness and BC activist, the poet Mandla 
Langa, ‘feared for Biko’s openness and obvious display of superior intellect, feared his manner would 
do him harm’ (Wilson, 2011: 109; also Langa, 2017). The further Biko pushed his performance, the 
more perilous it became.  
Much of the implicit information conveyed during such exchanges drew its performative 
power from ‘dramatic inversion’ – the turning upside-down of an audience’s expectations. These 
expectations usually derive from the performance’s dominant framing (Goffman, 1974). On the stage 
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of an apartheid court, it was not a Black witness’s ascribed role to provide a white judge with a lesson 
in contemporary African politics, nor was it his role to explain Hegelian dialectics to a white 
prosecuting lawyer, as Biko enthusiastically did at another point in the trial (Biko, 1979: 216). When 
Attwell pressed Biko on the meaning of a passage in a BC document, Biko returned Attwell’s 
questioning by asking him rhetorically, ‘Can’t you read?’ (Biko, 1979: 304). At another point, Biko 
took the lead in interrogating his inquisitor directly, letting loose a barrage of follow-up questions 
when what he deemed to be unsatisfactory answers were provided (Biko, 1979: 196). One of the 
defence lawyers, Navanethem Pillay, recalled how the defendants similarly refused to ‘play by the 
rules’, deciding not ‘to apply to the magistrate for permission for relief of their banning orders, and 
the magistrate would phone me to say, “You know, your clients are so discourteous, they refuse to say 
‘Your Worship’ or ‘Dear Sir’”’ (Pillay, 2002). These symbolic actions not only inverted the typical 
power relationships of a courtroom but, more broadly, those of a culturally structured and legally 
enshrined white supremacist society (Fredrickson, 1981).  
Echoing Mandela’s decision in his 1962 trial to ‘put the state itself on trial’ (Mandela, 1994: 
376), Biko similarly inverted the ascribed structure of the proceedings by redirecting the charge of 
terrorism away from the accused and towards the government. Biko asserted that ‘what happens to 
Black society at the receiving end of the system of oppression ... constitutes much more definite 
terrorism than what these men here are accused of’ (1979: 316). This appeal to an authority higher 
than the court in which it is made was a variation of the so-called ‘rupture defence’ made famous by 
anti-colonialist lawyer Jacques Vergès. On the point of the BCM’s relationship to the issue of 
violence, Biko reminds the court of the state’s own violence:  
I am talking about definite violence ... people being baton-charged by police, beaten up ... 
police charging on people ... without arms, and I am talking about the indirect violence that 
you get through starvation in townships ... the squalor that you meet at Winterveld as you go 
there now ... at Dimbasa ... where there is no food, there is hardly any furniture for people. I 
think that is, all put together, much more terrorism than what these guys have been saying. 
Now they stand charged. White society is not charged. (Biko, 1979: 170)  
Attwell reminded Biko that the defendents were accused of ‘causing or encouraging or 
furthering ... feelings of hostility’ (Biko, 1979: 200) and Biko responded that such a description 
amounted to exactly what  
the System does to us ... Black people are subject to daily experiences which do all the things 
that you are talking about—cause, encourage and further ... Each time they are insulted by a 
White man, for God’s sake, you must feel like reacting. (Biko, 1979: 200–201)  
Again, these ‘dramatic inversions’ drew their performative power from their upturning of 
assumed power relations. This unsettling of apartheid’s long-established culture structures implicitly 
communicated to the gathered audience that the internalisation of fear by Black people in South 
Africa was beginning to come to an end.  
Finally, insofar as Biko’s performance addressed a White as well as Black audience, it also 
aimed to expose the limits of White experience in comprehending the phenomenology of lived 
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Blackness in a racist society, what Fanon (1967) called the ‘Fact of Blackness’, or Manganyi (1973) 
termed ‘being-black-in-the-world’. Transforming the predicament of Blackness under apartheid into 
an experiential and political resource to which White society had no access, Biko reminded Attwell 
that he ‘hadn’t got the Black experience, unfortunately’, and that he ‘had to be Black to understand’ 
what he was talking about. When Attwell struggled to explain that he had ‘got the impression the very 
first time I read this document...’, Biko interrupted him with the simple statement that ‘That is 
because you are White’ (Biko, 1979: 243).  
Conclusion	 
The symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a cultural closet and arrayed 
before the public. Nor are new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes of revolt 
are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres. (Tarrow, 1998: 118)  
This article has offered a performative analysis of Biko’s appearance as a witness at the 
SASO/BPC trial, showing how within a context of severe repression and legally- enshrined racism, 
techniques of performance opened up opportunities for resistance. When Biko was forbidden from 
speaking or writing for a public audience, the courtroom stage provided a rare platform both to 
verbally expound the principles of BC philosophy, and to performatively act them out. Demonstrating 
the significance of pre-established culture structures in both enabling and limiting effective political 
performance, this study has revealed, firstly, how conventional repertoires of resistance can be 
creatively reiterated across various scenes, and secondly, how established codes of domination can be 
subverted for a movement’s political advantage.  
In terms of the first contribution, it is clear that culture is by definition a public affair (Geertz, 
1973: 12), and it is this characteristic of culture that allows us to talk about it as a ‘structure’ at all. 
The paper has shown how many of the courtroom performances could only resonate by virtue of their 
being publicly available and comprehensible, which itself relied upon their reinterpreting older, 
established structures of resistance. This meant that the movement was not compelled to ‘reinvent the 
wheel’ in order for their interventions to have an effect (McAdam & Rucht, 1993: 58). This point 
should not be taken to suggest that this episode, nor BC as a movement more generally, was merely 
derivative, as has been implied elsewhere (Mandela, 2001; Sono, 1993). Rather, it suggests that 
symbolic expressions acquire both their intelligibility and their dramatic efficacy from reworking – 
typically in creative permutations – pre-established cultural configurations. In terms of the second 
contribution, confronting established power was achieved by performatively inverting symbolic 
hierarchies that both the courtroom stage and wider apartheid society relied upon as cultural buttresses 
to their legitimacy. In a context where formal political engagement was denied to Blacks, and where 
the preceding generation of anti-apartheid activists had been jailed, killed, pushed into exile, or forced 
to operate underground, BC’s aboveground performances acted as a continuation of politics by other 
means. They also demonstrated how the culture structures from which such performances derive their 
significance both constrain and enable innovation.  
The official outcome of the trial was that all of the accused were found guilty of at least one 
charge brought against them and sentenced to a minimum of five to six years on Robben Island. Its 
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performative outcome is less easily assessed. Biko gave his evidence at the SASO/BPC trial and was 
later killed. But since social performance is never so easily bookended (Morgan and Baert, 2015: 80), 
even by state killings, many of the cultural motifs manifested during the trial have continued to be 
expressed by resistance movements in South Africa and elsewhere.  
The Soweto uprising, for instance, erupted only a month after Biko’s widely-reported 
testimony and while the trial was still ongoing.15 This uprising was mostly a spontaneous affair, and 
beyond the immediate precipitating factors of the National Party’s imposition of the Afrikaans 
language in the so-called ‘Bantu’ schools and the subsequent firing on unarmed protesting school 
children, there is much debate over its broader political determinants and the specific role played by 
BC in inspiring the events (e.g. Charney, 2000: 579–653; Hirschmann, 1990; Hirson, 1979; Lodge, 
1983: 330; Magaziner, 2010: 154–157; Mandela, 2001: 47; Marx, 1992: 65–70; Mazibuko, 2016; 
Pohlandt-McCormick, 2005; Wilson, 2011: 110–111). Nevertheless, the high school BC organisation, 
the South African Student’s Movement (SASM), certainly played a significant role,16 and BC 
symbolism was ubiquitous in the protesting students’ placards, graffiti, and slogans. BC ideas had 
acquired much popularity amongst Soweto schoolchildren during this period (e.g. Johnson, 1988: 15; 
Kane-Berman, 1978), in large part via politically-aware teachers who had either been expelled or 
voluntarily left the Black universities following their involvement with SASO (Brown, 2016: 128– 
130; Heffernan, 2015).  
Whatever the extent of the BCM’s role in shaping the Soweto events, just as their own 
performative interventions drew upon cultural forms established in resistance movements earlier and 
elsewhere (Gerhart, 1978: 270–281), so the Soweto students likewise borrowed and adapted much of 
the BCM’s and other movements’ symbolic repertoires to meet the challenges of their own 
predicament. Brown, for instance, discusses how the Soweto radicals translated the models and ideas 
provided by BC ‘in terms of their own experiences, and—in doing so—catalysed a true insurrection 
on the streets of the township’ (2016: 154). He points out that although the BCM did not lead the 
uprising, ‘their ideas and their examples would be reinterpreted and reinvented’ by the Soweto youth 
(ibid.). As one might expect, the cultural formations of resistance that were crystallised in Soweto 
have in turn been reiterated in many subsequent movements both in South Africa and beyond 
(Heffernan and Nieftagodien, 2016; Turner and Alan, 1986), and this paper’s arguments suggest that 
such inflected cultural reiteration will only continue to occur.  
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Notes	 
1. The number of accused was initially 13, but charges against four were later dropped, and the 
remaining nine – including four of the five members of the South African Students’ 
Organisation (SASO)’s national executive – were recharged.  
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2. This was alongside, and in addition to, the more basic task of successful performance in 
communicating explicit symbolic information to its audiences.  
3. Most of the charges in the indictments brought against the SASO/BPC nine related to the 
organisation of rallies in September 1974 to mark the success of the Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (FRELIMO) in forming a majority in neighbouring Mozambique’s transitional 
government, following the 1974 coup in Portugal and a decade-long guerrilla war (Badet, 
2009: 86; Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 145–147; MacQueen, 2013: 520–522; Magaziner, 2010: 
152–154). Since FRELIMO were socialist, and the apartheid regime was implacably opposed 
to any form of socialism, the BCM’s solidarity with FRELIMO immediately provoked a state 
response (Nengwekhulu, 2017). These rallies represented a watershed in the BCM’s embrace 
of confrontational protest (Brown, 2012) and were banned the evening before their scheduled 
occurrence by the Minister of Justice, though crucially, this was not published in the 
Government Gazette (i.e. officially pronounced) until the morning of the rallies (Brown, 
2016: 144; Cooper, 2016). A simultaneous anti-FRELIMO rally in Johannesburg took place 
unabated (IUEF, 1977: 7). The Secretary General of SASO, Muntu Myeze, released a press 
statement that the solidarity rallies would go ahead, even though it appears that Biko opposed 
this decision. Disorder also broke out when police dispersed a FRELIMO solidarity meeting 
on the black campus of the University of the North (Wolfson, 1976). Neither Zithulele Cindi, 
nor Strini Moodley participated in the rallies, but both were nonetheless charged for their 
organisational roles in leading the purported conspiracy to bring about revolutionary change 
and further racial hostility, of which, according to the state, the FRELIMO rallies were an 
expression.  
4. Section 6(1) of The Terrorism Act also permitted indefinite incommunicado detention 
without trial, during which torture was common (Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 554–559) and a 
disturbingly large number of detainees died. This was to be Biko’s own fate the year 
following the trial. When official explanations of such deaths were forthcoming (often there 
was no explanation at all), the security police often claimed the prisoner had committed 
‘suicide by hanging’, ‘slipped in the shower’, or had ‘fallen down the stairwell’. In one case 
the detainee was said to have fallen from a tenth-floor window.  
5. It was in fact during the trial that Biko, again at much risk to himself, publically revealed his 
identity as ‘Frank Talk’, the author of a widely-read column in the SASO newsletter (a charge 
that the prosecution was trying to pin on one of the accused – Strini Moodley, SASO’s 
publicity secretary). Biko had also been writing a column in the Daily Despatch under 
Mapetla Mohapi’s name, an activist who also died in police custody.  
6. The Rand Daily Mail became particularly active in amplifying and disseminating Biko’s 
courtroom message throughout South Africa after having earlier been criticised by the BCM 
for failing to use the affirmative self-definition of ‘Black’ instead of the narcissistic negation 
‘non-white’ (Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 124). The World newspaper also played a crucial role, 
and was also banned. Percy Qoboza, the editor, was detained during the final government 
crackdown on the BCM on so-called ‘Black Wednesday’, 19 October 1977.  
7. One anti-apartheid lawyer described this ambivalent role of apartheid law to me in an 
interview: ‘in order to be good at one’s job and potentially provide a check on state power, 
one had to think legally, but the danger was always giving the law a respect and importance it 
shouldn’t have had’ (Budlender, 2017).  
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8. Some of the defendants alleged they had been tortured by security police during interrogation 
leading up to this trial (BCP, 1975: 85–86).  
9. At his death, Biko had a pending charge of contravening his banning order by entering an 
educational institution to take a law exam.  
10. Toyi-Toyi is a Southern African stomping and marching dance frequently used in protests 
during the apartheid era. Developed out of a war dance, it is usually accompanied by call-and-
response chanting, and continues to be widely used in demonstrations to the present day.  
11. This book was published outside South Africa, and immediately banned within (McDonald, 
2009).  
12. Possibly influenced by memories of Biko’s earlier performances, Boshoff passed judgement 
in a later case that there was ‘prima facie evidence of improper and disgraceful medical 
conduct’ by the doctors who had examined Biko’s evidently tortured body before his eventual 
death (Taitz, 1986: 374).  
13. In 1974 Harry Nengwekhulu had called for the BPC to take up arms, and Keith Mokoape had 
done likewise the following year (Mangcu, 2014: 190, 198).  
14. Odinga in fact died of natural causes in 1994.  
15. Reflecting on the violence of the uprising, Biko in fact later expressed an idea developed in 
this article – is that in repressive contexts, political performance acts as a substitute for 
conventional modes of political action: ‘people started burning down buildings, stoning police 
... and in their minds, this was the only language that white people would understand’ (1977).  
16. The involvement of SASO in ‘conscientising’ (Freire, 1970; Nkrumah, 1964) SASM students 
was part of the evidence brought by the state in the SASO/BCP trail (Exhibit SASO G4, 163). 
The BC activist and Soweto school teacher Onkgopotse Tiro, who was murdered by the South 
African state via parcel bomb in 1974, had been president of SASM. His student, Tsietsi 
Mashinini, was a senior SASM office-bearer and led the uprising.  
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AD1719 ‘State vs. S. Cooper and 8 Others’, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of 
the Witwatersrand. 
Exhibit SASO G4, 163 ‘Commissions Presented at 4th General Students’ Council of the South 
African Students’ Organisation’, Report of the Community Development Commission.  
	
References	 
Alexander JC (1996) Collective action, culture and civil society: Secularizing, updating, inverting, 
revising and displacing the classical model of social movements. In: Clark J and Diani M (eds) Alain 
Touraine. London: Routledge.  
Alexander JC (2004) Cultural pragmatics: Social performance between ritual and strategy. 
Sociological Theory 22(4): 527–573.  
Page 18 of 23 
Alexander JC (2011) Performative Revolution in Egypt: An Essay in Cultural Power. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic.  
Alexander JC and Jaworsky B (2014) Obama Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ansell G (2004) Soweto Blues: Jazz, Popular Music, and Politics in South Africa. London: 
Bloomsbury.  
Aristotle (1991) The Art of Rhetoric. London: Penguin Classics. 
Arnold M (1979) Introduction. In: Biko S, Black Consciousness in South Africa, ed. Millard Arnold. 
New York: Vintage Books, pp. xiii–xxxvi. 
Austin JL (1962) How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Badet S (2009) Black Man, You Are On Your Own. Johannesburg: STE Publishers. 
Bauer M (1996) The narrative interview: Comments on a technique for qualitative data collection. 
LSE Methodology Institute Papers in Social Research Methods, Qualitative Series 1. 
BCP (1975) Black Review 1974–5, ed. Thoko Mbanjwa. Durban: Black Community Programmes. 
Biko S (1977) Steven Biko ‘s final interview, August 1977. Available at: 
https://archive.org/details/LastInterviewWithBrotherStevenBiko (accessed 6 January 2017). 
Biko S (1978) I Write What I Like, ed. Aelred Stubbs. London: Heinemann. 
Biko S (1979) Black Consciousness in South Africa, ed. Millard Arnold. New York: Vintage Books. 
Bizos G (1998) The passion of Steve Biko. In: No One to Blame? In Pursuit of Justice in South 
Africa. Claremont, South Africa: David Philip Publishers. 
Brown D (1997) Black Consciousness, tradition and modernity: Ingoapele Madingoane’s ‘black trial’. 
Current Writing: Text and Reception in Southern Africa 9(1): 1–26. 
Brown J (2012) An experiment in confrontation: The pro-Frelimo rallies of 1974. Journal of South 
African Studies 38(1): 55–71. 
Brown J (2016) The Road to Soweto: Resistance and the Uprising of 16 June 1976. Johannesburg: 
Jacana. 
Budlender G (2017) Geoff Budlender interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 24 March, Cape Town.  
Cavell S (2005) Passionate and performative utterance: Morals of an encounter. In: Contending with 
Stanley Cavell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 177–198. 
Charney C (1993) Black power, white press: Literacy, newspapers, and the transformation of 
township political culture. African Studies Institute Seminar Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 
South Africa. 
Charney C (2000) Civil society vs. the state: Identity, institutions, and the black consciousness 
movement in South Africa. PhD Thesis, Yale University, USA.  
Page 19 of 23 
Christenson R (ed.) (1991) Political Trials in History from Antiquity to the Present. Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers.  
Cindi Z (2015) Zithulele Cindi interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 28 December, Johannesburg. 
CISA (1976) South Africa: A Police State? Christian Institute of South Africa (Historical Papers, 
University of the Witwatersrand). 
Cooper S (2016) Saths Cooper interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 29 August, Johannesburg. 
Coplan DB (2008) In Township Tonight! South Africa’s Black City Music and Theatre, 2nd edn. 
Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
Dahl RA (1957) ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy’ Journal of Public Law, 6: 279–95. 
Dugard J (1978) Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Durkheim E (2001 [1912]) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eyerman R and Jamison A (1998) Music and Social Movements: Mobilising Traditions in the 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fanon F (1967) Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. 
Fredrickson G (1981) White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African 
History. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Freire P (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum. 
Fuller B, Liang X and Hua H (1996) Did black literacy rise after Soweto? Public problems and ethnic 
archipelagos in South Africa. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 37: 97–120. 
Geertz C (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Geertz C (1980) Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Geertz C (1983) Centres, kings, and charisma: Reflections on the symbolics of power. In: Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology. New York: Basic Books.  
Gerhart G (1978) Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Goffman E (1974) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Goffman E (1990 [1959]) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin Books.  
Hall S (1973) Encoding/decoding. In: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (ed.) Culture, Media, 
Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–79. London: Hutchinson, pp. 128–138. 
Page 20 of 23 
Heffernan A (2015) Black Consciousness’s lost leader: Abraham Tiro, the University of the North, 
and the seeds of South Africa’s student movement in the 1970s. Journal of Southern African Studies 
41(1): 173–186. 
Heffernan A and Nieftagodien N (eds) (2016) Students Must Rise: Youth Struggle in South Africa 
Before and Beyond Soweto ’76. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 
Hill SL (2015) Biko’s Ghost: The Iconography of Black Consciousness. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Hirschmann D (1990) The black consciousness movement in South Africa. The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 28(1): 1–22. 
Hirson B (1979) Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt, Roots of a Revolution? London: Zed 
Books. 
IUEF (1977) Who are the Real Terrorists? A Document on the SASO/BPC Trial by the International 
University Exchange Fund, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid. New York: United Nations.  
Jasper J (1997) The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Johnston H and Klandermans B (eds) (1995) Social Movements and Culture. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Johnson RW (1988) Black on black: In South Africa. London Review of Books 10(24): 14–16.  
Kane-Berman J (1978) Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction. Johannesburg: Raven Press. 
Karis TG and Gerhart GM (1997) From Protest to Challenge: Volume 5: Nadir and Resurgence 
1964–1979. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Kentridge S (2012) Evil under the sun: The death of Steve Biko. In: Free Country: Selected Talks and 
Lectures. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Langa M (2017) Mandla Langa interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 2 February, Johannesburg. 
Lekota M (2016) Mosioua ‘Terror’ Lekota interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 30 August, Johannesburg. 
Lobban M (1996) White Man’s Justice: South African Political Trials in the Black Consciousness 
Era. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Lodge T (1983) Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945. London and New York: Longman. 
McAdam D and Rucht D (1997) The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 528: 56–74. 
McDonald PD (2009) The Literature Police. Database of banned books in apartheid South Africa, 
http://www.theliteraturepolice.com (accessed 4 February 2016). 
MacQueen I (2013) Black Consciousness in dialogue in South Africa: Steve Biko, Richard Turner 
and the ‘Durban moment’, 1970–1974. Journal of Asian and African Studies 49(5): 511–525. 
Page 21 of 23 
Magaziner D (2010) The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968–1977. 
Athens: Ohio University Press. 
Manchester Guardian (1976), ‘Burning the Black Power Candle’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8th 
February, 1976. 
Mandela N (1994) Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. London: Little, 
Brown, & Co. 
Mandela N (2001) Whither the black consciousness movement? In: Prison Reflections: Voices from 
the South African Liberation Struggle. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 
Manganyi NC (1973) Being-black-in-the-world. Johannesburg: SPRO-CAS/Raven Press.  
Mangcu X (2014) Biko: A Life. London: IB Tauris. 
Marx AW (1992) Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960–1990. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Massey D (2005) For Space. London: Sage. 
Mast JL (2012) The Performative Presidency: Crisis and Resurrection During the Clinton Years. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mazibuko S (2016) Seth Mazibuko interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 23 August, Soweto. 
Meyer DS and Whitter N (1994) Social movement spillover. Social Problems 41(2): 277–298. 
Mokoape K (2017) Keith Mokoape interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 22 January, Midrand. 
Moodley A (2002) Asha Moodley interviewed by Dimakatso Shongwe, 15 August, University of 
Durban-Westville Media Centre. 
Moodley A (2017) Asha Moodley interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 6 April, Durban. 
Moodley L (2017) Lingam Moodley interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 22 July, London. 
Moodley S (2002) Strini Moodley interviewed by Dimakatso Shongwe, 24 July, University of 
Durban-Westville Media Centre. 
Morgan M and Baert P (2015) Conflict in the Academy: A Study in the Sociology of Intellectuals. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Morgan M and Baert P (2017) Acting out ideas: Performative citizenship in the Black Consciousness 
Movement. American Journal of Cultural Sociology 1–44. Epub ahead of print 21 June. DOI: 
10.1057/s41290-017-0030-1.  
Nefolovhodwe P (2017) Pandelani Nefolovhodwe interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 1 February, 
Johannesburg. 
Nengwekhulu H (2017) Harry Nengwekhulu interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 20 and 31 January, 
Pretoria. 
Page 22 of 23 
Nkrumah K (1964) Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation. New York: Monthly 
Review Press. 
Nolutshungu S (1982) Changing South Africa: Political Considerations. Manchester: University of 
Manchester Press. 
Pillay N (2002) Navanethem Pillay interviewed by Vino Reddy, 11 August, Gandhi-Luthuli 
Documentation Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. 
Pityana B (1991) Revolution within the law. In: Pityana B et al. (eds) Bounds of Possibility: The 
Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness. London: Zed Books. 
Pohlandt-McCormick H (2005) ‘I Saw a Nightmare ...’: Doing Violence to Memory: The Soweto  
Uprising, June 16, 1976. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Polletta F (2006) It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Ramphele M (1995) A Life. Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip Publishers. 
Rosenberg GN (1991) The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rosenthal R and Flacks R (2011) Playing for Change: Music and Musicians in the Service of Social 
Movements. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. 
Sartre JP (1976) Sartre on Theatre. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Schechner R (1988) Performance Theory, revised and updated edn. New York and London: 
Routledge. 
Smith P and Howe N (2015) Climate Change as Social Drama: Global Warming in the Public 
Sphere. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Snow DA, Burke Rochford E Jr, Worden SK and Benford RD (1986) Frame alignment processes, 
micromobilization and movement participation. American Sociological Review 51: 464–481.  
Sono T (1993) Reflections on the Origins of Black Consciousness in South Africa. Pretoria: HSRC 
Press. 
Soule SA (1997) The student divestment movement in the United States and tactical diffusion: The 
shantytown protest. Social Forces 75(3): 855–883. 
Stubbs A (1978) Introduction to ‘The righteousness of our strength’. In: Biko S (ed.) I Write What I 
Like. London: Heinemann, pp. 121–122. 
Study Commission on US Policy Towards South Africa (SCUSPTSA) (1981) South Africa: Time 
Running Out. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Swidler A (2001) Cultural power and social movements. In: Spillman L (ed.) Cultural Sociology.  
Page 23 of 23 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 311–323. 
Taitz J (1986) Medical mores, judicial review, and the last days of Steve Biko. The Modern Law 
Review 49. 
Tarrow S (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements & Contentious Politics, 2nd edn. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: Random House. 
The Star (1976), ‘A Step Forward for Saso Defense’ The Star, 24th July, 1976. 
Touraine A (1981) The Voice and the Eye, 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Turner L and Alan J (1986) Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought. Detroit, MI: News 
& Letters.  
Variava S (2017) Sadecque Variava interviewed by Marcus Morgan, 24 January, Lenasia 
Johannesburg. 
Walshe P (1983) Church Versus State in South Africa: The Case of the Christian Institute. London: C. 
Hurst & Co. Publishers. 
Wikileaks (1975a) ‘Defence Team of SASO/BPC Trial’, US Department of State Memo, from 
American Consul, Durban, March, 1975. 
Wikileaks (1975b) ‘SASO/BPC Trial Adjourned’, from American Embassy, Pretoria, June, 1975. 
Williams R (1989) Resources of Hope. London: Verso. 
Williams R (1995) Constructing the public good: Social movements and cultural resources. Social 
Problems 42(1): 124–144. 
Wilson L (2011) Steve Biko. Johannesburg: Jacana Books. 
Wolfson JGE (1976) Turmoil at Turfloop: A Summary of the Reports of the Snyman and Jackson 
Commissions of Inquiry into the University of the North. Johannesburg: SA Institute of Race 
Relations.  
Author	biography	 Marcus	Morgan	is a Lecturer in Sociology in the School of Sociology, Politics and International 
Studies at the University of Bristol. He is the author of Pragmatic Humanism: On The Nature & 
Value of Sociological Knowledge (Routledge, 2016) and, with Patrick Baert, Conflict in the Academy: 
A Study in the Sociology of Intellectuals (Palgrave, 2015).  
 
